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Abstract
A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be 
predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem 
of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to 
live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable 
disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly 
recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse 
to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team 
members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model 
is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed 
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the 
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is 
one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be 
careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. 
Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At 
this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” 
maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, 
(b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable 
feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to 
make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus 
present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. 
As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science 
will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts 
were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus 
reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer 
to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that 
one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various 
unfortunate consequences.
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these 
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus 
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is 
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the 
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, 
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he claims that human communication rests on an implicit commitment to a sort of 
“ideal speech situation” which is the normative foundation of agreement in linguistic 
matters. Consequently, the quest for consensus is a constitutive feature of our nature 
of (rational) human beings: rationality and consensus are tied together. A very strong 
consequence derives from Habermas’ premises: were we to abandon the search 
for consensus we would lose rationality, too, and this makes us understand that he 
views the pursuit of consensus as a regulative principle (rather than as a merely 
practical objective). Rescher opposes both Peirce’s eschatological view and Habermas’ 
regulative and idealized one.
Keywords: Pragmatism; Science; Cultural evolution; Political philosophy; Consensus; 
Social contract
Pragmatists always had clear ideas about the relations between the natural and 
the social worlds. Most of them tell us, first of all, that human beings have evolved 
within nature as creatures that solve their survival problems through intelligence. The 
emergence of intelligence, on the other hand, must not be seen as a purpose of nature 
itself, but rather as our functional version of survival mechanisms such as physical force 
or numerousness. The systematic use of this intelligence in a context which is eminently 
social and communicative creates - through cultural evolution - a methodology of 
rational inquiry that enables us to develop, and test, cognitive models of the real to 
explain the structure of our experience. No doubt our science is the best instantiation 
of these cognitive models, but pragmatist thinkers, unlike the positivists old and new, 
by no means claim that it is also the completion of this work. Other responses are 
always required. In particular, we must create a sort of “superstructure” made up 
of values, many of which (i.e., cognitive values like coherence, comprehensiveness, 
simplicity, etc.) are useful instruments within the cognitive project itself. This explains 
why, for instance, economic considerations are certainly important in the conduct of 
our cognitive affairs.
However, when it comes to conducting our socio-political affairs,1 these values, which 
can always be tested pragmatically, are also underdeterminate. In other words, they 
do not lead to a specific and exact resolution of the issues at stake, but leave rather 
room for alternative and competing ways of conducting our inter-personal affairs. This 
means that abstract rationality alone is insufficient to enforce a consensus on social 
issues, and on a larger scale, ideological and political issues as well. The problem is 
that, on the purely theoretical side, such dissonance has no dramatic consequences. 
But on the practical side of public policy, any attempt to achieve resolution on these 
issues can have - and many times actually has - unfortunate consequences by way of 
producing conflicts. This should explain well enough why the criticism of all theories 
1 It should be noted that no clear and neat border-line exists between the social and the political realms.
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based on consensus is the starting point of many pragmatists’ social and political 
philosophy.
Nicholas Rescher, for example, deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated 
in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. Rather, he argues that an essential 
problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable 
people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not 
eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. These remarks, in 
turn, strictly recall the practical impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having 
recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model 
of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate 
model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed 
system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the 
entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community 
is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must 
be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Rescher, eventually, 
finds many similarities between the scientific and the business communities:
The pursuit of knowledge in science can play a role akin to that of pursuit of wealth in 
business transactions. The financial markets in stocks or commodities futures would 
self-destruct if the principle, my word is my bond, were abrogated, since no one 
would know whether a trade had actually been made. In just this way, too, the market 
information would self-destruct if people’s truthfulness could not be relied upon. Thus 
in both cases, unreliable people have to be frozen out and exiled from the community. 
In cognitive and economic contexts alike, the relevant community uses incentives and 
sanctions (artificially imposed costs and benefits) to put into place a system where 
people generally act in a trusting and trustworthy way. Such a system is based on 
processes of reciprocity that advantage virtually everyone.2
Let us ask: why Rescher thinks that the idea of consensus may - and in many cases 
does - cause dangerous consequences? After all consensus, i.e. the uniformity 
of belief and evaluation, has been considered by many prominent philosophers of 
the Western tradition as an ideal both good and worth being pursued. Consensus, 
however, is essentially a matter of agreement, and the fact is that people sometimes 
agree on various sorts of things and sometimes (or, maybe better, most of the times) 
do not. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) the 
“consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, 
on the other, (b) the “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to 
be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, 
therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it.
2 N. Rescher, Cognitive Economy, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1989, p. 44.
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Rescher clearly sides with the pluralistic field, and his pro-pluralism arguments pivot 
on the following remarks: “The long and short of it is that consensus appertains to 
rationality as an ideal, not as a realizable ‘fact of life’. The points of ‘universal agreement 
among rational people’ are not a matter of an ultimately discovered de facto universal 
consensus people independently predetermined as rational. It is simply a matter of the 
meaning-standards that we who use this notion impose upon the idea of ‘rationality’ 
in the first place.”3 It follows that we use the concept of “consensus” in a rather circular 
way. Someone might bona fide believe that he or she is using it in a perfectly neutral 
manner but, actually, we always use predetermined standards in order to define who 
a “rational person” is.
Things being so, all theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. 
This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth 
to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long 
run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended.4 By taking this 
path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific 
community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been 
found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were 
looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. 
What concerns us in this context is that, for Peirce, there really exists an ultimate 
method of question-resolution which produces results acceptable by everyone and 
that, furthermore, equates factual truth with a sort of “long-run” consensus. Rescher 
rightly notes that “for Peirce, science is effectively a latter-day surrogate - a functional 
equivalent - for the medieval philosopher’s conception of the ‘mind of God’.”. 5
In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these 
Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus 
indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is 
to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the 
course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, 
he claims that human communication rests on an implicit commitment to a sort of 
“ideal speech situation” which is the normative foundation of agreement in linguistic 
matters. Consequently, the quest for consensus is a constitutive feature of our nature 
of (rational) human beings: rationality and consensus are tied together. A very strong 
consequence derives from Habermas’ premises: were we to abandon the search for 
consensus we would lose rationality, too, and this makes us understand that he views 
the pursuit of consensus as a regulative principle (rather than as a merely practical 
objective).
3 N. Rescher, Pluralism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 9-10.
4 See C.J. Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry. A Peircean Account of Truth, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991.
5 N. Rescher, Pluralism, cit., p. 24n.
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Rescher thus opposes both Peirce’s eschatological view and Habermas’ regulative and 
idealized one. To all those authors who contend that science, for example, is a typically 
consensus-seeking enterprise, he replies that, even in this context, consensus remains 
an aspiration. Agreement is usually achieved on issues of concrete particularity, but 
never extends to broader, theoretical domains, because controversy is all too common 
in the scientific domain. If we take into account Rescher’s stance about scientific 
realism, it may be easily verified that, for him, there is no scientific knowledge as such, 
but just our scientific knowledge, which turns out to be relativized to the kinds of 
experience we have. Science always is a two-sided enterprise, in which both nature and 
experiencing subjects have a fundamental role to play. We may not plausibly assume 
that the science of different civilizations will significantly resembles ours. But we can 
proceed even further, by supposing that the very topics of an alien (extraterrestrial) 
science could differ dramatically from our own, probably due to the fact that they 
experience nature in quite different ways. After all, we developed electromagnetic 
theory because our environment provides us with lodestones and electrical storms, 
but this is not a necessary feature of all natural environment present in the Universe 
at large. To sum up, we have the following kind of picture:
To what extent would the functional equivalent of natural science built up by the 
inquiring intelligences of an astronomically remote civilization be bound to resemble 
our science? To begin with, the machinery of formulation used in expressing their 
science might be altogether different. Specifically, their mathematics might be 
very unlike ours. Their dealings with quantity might be entirely anumerical - purely 
comparative, for example, rather than quantitative. Especially if their environment 
is not amply endowed with solid objects or stable structures congenial to 
measurement - if, for example, they were jellyfish-like creatures swimming about in a 
soupy sea - their “geometry” could be something rather strange, largely topological, 
say, and geared to flexible structures rather than fixed sizes or shapes. One’s language 
and thought processes are bound to be closely geared to the world as one experiences 
it.6
This sort of mental experiment, as distant as it may seem at first sight from the issues 
we were discussing above, is instead likely to tell us something important about the 
problem of consensus. For it is clear that, as we may assumedly “scan” nature in 
a way partially or totally different from that of hypothetical alien creatures, so we 
normally “scan” the social world in a way partially or totally different from the other 
intelligent beings with whom we share it. And this simply is a fact of life that everybody 
can personally verify, and not a mere theoretical assumption. Right at this level of 
analysis Rescher finds a good confirmation of a basic thesis of his: conceptualization 
(and value-endowment as well) is always with us, and forms part and parcel of the 
6 N. Rescher, The Limits of Science, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1984, pp. 176-178.
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world-as-we-know-it. To put it in a slightly different way, cognitive usage of different 
bodies of experience takes naturally different inquirers to achieve diverse results, so 
that cognitive dissensus is an inevitable outcome of the experiential diversity among 
inquirers.
At this point, a theorist of consensus like Habermas might as well reply that, after 
all, he never meant to deny the presence of disagreement and cognitive dissensus in 
human society. But it is just because dissensus leads to the enhancement of disorder 
in the social body that we must try to overcome it, thus transcending the actual course 
of things. Rescher’s position in this regard is that such a transcending step entails the 
presence of a privileged viewpoint that we do not have at our disposal, so that “truth 
and consensus converge only in the ideal limit - only when we can contemplate the 
sort of agreement that would be reached by ideally rational inquirers working under 
ideally favorable conditions.”7 But such conditions are never given in practical life. In 
science our discoveries, although theoretically “secured” by the scientific method, 
constantly need corrections, adjustments and, often, even replacements. Just the 
same is valid in the practical conduct of our cognitive affairs, where the “ideal inquiry” 
would require an “ideal rationality” on the part of the inquirers and the absence of 
limitations on our resources: neither of these two conditions are practically achievable 
in the concrete world of our actions and deliberations. To use an all-encompassing 
slogan: We must learn how to live with dissensus, because this is what the normal 
course of things forces upon us.
At this point, an important question still needs to be addressed. One is in fact entitled 
to ask: Does pluralism lead to skepticism or syncretism? No doubt this is one of the 
possible outcomes of a pluralistic theory like Rescher’s, and our author points out 
that this possibility has often been exploited in the history of Western philosophy. 
Leaving aside the ancient skeptics, it is interesting to note that Rescher takes Richard 
Rorty to be a good representative of the skepticism of our day, since he claims that 
the standards of the community are the only subjectivity-transcending resource at our 
disposal. As for syncretism, Rescher observes that Paul Feyerabend’s famous motto 
“anything goes” is the best contemporary example of this trend of thought, according 
to which men must endorse the whole set of cognitive alternatives they meet in 
everyday life.
Rescher, instead, sees no direct linkage between pluralism on the one hand, and 
skepticism or syncretism on the other. Certainly we have no direct access to the absolute 
Truth, the only path at our disposal being determined by what we conscientiously 
believe. But the fact that other people may think differently from ourselves is no 
reason for preventing us from having confidence in the correctness of our views; in 
other words, neither the others’ agreement with us nor their disagreement shows 
7 N. Rescher, Pluralism, cit., p. 54.
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that we are actually holding false beliefs. No contradiction shows up between the 
“defining principles of rationality” and the pluralistic differentiation that stems from 
the many available answers to the question: “What is it rational to do?.” The sphere 
of rationality, in fact, is a flexible structure formed by what Rescher calls a “hierarchy 
of levels.”
We have thus a pluralism without indifferentism, in the sense that “the absence of 
consensus simply is not - in the very logic of the situation - a decisive impediment 
to rational validity and impersonal cogency.”8 As long as we see our own position as 
rationally appropriate and are able to argue in its favor, we must have the courage 
of our convictions. If one accepts these basic tenets it is all too natural to think that 
personal positions can indeed by supported by standards of impersonal cogency. Those 
who take relativism to be a logical and natural consequence of pluralism erroneously 
think that, given the diversity of the various positions, we cannot choose among them. 
To the contrary,
A pluralism of potential basis-diversity in rational inquiry is altogether compatible with 
an absolutistic commitment to our own basis. One can certainly combine a relativistic 
pluralism of possible alternatives with a monistic position regarding ideal rationality 
and a firm and reasoned commitment to the standards intrinsic to one’s own 
position. Rational is as rational does - it hinges on the norms, standards, and criteria 
that we ourselves can endorse as rationally appropriate on the basis of what best 
qualifies - from where we stand - as a well-considered position as to what is appropriate 
for anybody.9
For sure we must recognize the presence of different perspectives, but on the other 
hand our experiential indications provide us with criteria for making a rational choice. 
The fact that no appropriate universal diet exists does not lead to the conclusion that 
we can eat anything, and the absence of a globally correct language does not mean 
that we can choose a language at random for communicating with others in a particular 
context. For these reasons he concludes that “an individual need not be intimidated 
by the fact of disagreement - it makes perfectly good sense for people to do their 
rational best towards securing evidential beliefs and justifiable choices without undue 
worry about whether or not others disagree.”10
So we are left with the question: To what extent are Rescher’s doubts about consensus 
applicable to the real social and political situations? As it was remarked before, in fact, 
consensus is deemed by many authors to be a sine qua non condition for achieving a 
benign political and social order, while its absence is often viewed as a premonitory 
8 Ibid., p. 101.
9 Ibid., p. 109.
10 Ibid., p. 125.
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symptom of chaos. Needless to say the feelings are usually strong in this regard, 
because political and social philosophy has a more direct impact on our daily life than 
other such traditional sectors of the philosophical inquiry as, say, metaphysics or 
epistemology. It might be argued that these latter disciplines’ importance for our life 
is as least as great (although less visible) than that of political philosophy, but this is 
not our task in the present context.
What deserves to be pointed out now is that the search for consensus has many 
concrete contraindications, which can mainly be drawn from history. Think, for 
instance, of how Hitler gained power in Germany in the 1930’s. As a matter of fact 
he obtained a resounding victory through democratic election, because he was able 
to make the political platform of the Nazi party consensually accepted by a large 
majority of citizens. It would be foolish, however, to draw the conclusion that Hitler 
and the Nazis were right just because they were very good consensus-builders. On 
the contrary, the United States is a good example of a democratically thriving society 
which can dispense with consensus, and where dissensus is deemed to be productive 
(at least to a certain extent). Another striking fact is that the former Soviet Union was, 
instead, a typically consensus-seeking society. Dissensus there was severely banned 
an punished, and that situation matches well Rescher’s words:
Not only is insistence on the pursuit of general consensus in practical matters and public 
affairs unrealistic, it is also counter-productive. For it deprives us of the productive 
stimulus of competition and the incentive of rivalry. In many situations of human life, 
people are induced to make their best effort in inquiry or creative activity through 
rivalry rather than conformity. Productivity, creativity, and the striving for excellence 
are - as often as not - the offspring of diversity and conflict. Dissensus has this to be 
said for it, at least, that it is at odds with a stifling orthodoxy. A dissent accommodating 
society is ipso facto pluralistic, with all the advantages that accrue in situations where 
no one school of thought is able to push the others aside.11
By adopting this line of reasoning, the commonsense view about the subject is practically 
reversed. Homogeneity granted by consensus is not the mark of a benign social order, 
since this role is more likely to be played by a dissensus-dominated situation which 
is in turn able to accommodate diversity of opinions. It follows, among other things, 
that we should be very careful not to characterize the consensus endorsed by majority 
opinion as intrinsically rational. In the industrialized nations of the Western world the 
power of the media (especially TV) in building up consensus is notoriously great. It 
may - and does - happen sometimes, however, that the power of the media in assuring 
consensus is used to support bad politicians, who repay the favor by paying attention 
to sectorial rather than to general interests. It is thus easily seen that consensus is not 
an objective that deserves to be pursued no matter what.
11 Ibid., p. 158.
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All this seems plausible and reasonable, despite the fact that many theorists nowadays 
continue to view consensus an indispensable component of a good and stable social 
order. It is the case, once again, with Jürgen Habermas. The Marxist roots of Habermas’ 
thought12 explain why the German philosopher is so eager to have the activities of the 
people harmonized thank to their interpersonal agreement about ends and means. 
The basis of agreement is thus both collective and abstractly universal. Consensus, 
in Habermas’ view, is a pre-requisite for cooperation and the fundamental task of 
philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the possibility of disagreement. The quest for 
consensus is so important that its abandonment would make us lose our rationality. 
What type of consensus, however, are we talking about in this context? It must clearly 
be a sort of ideal whose pursuit is more an highly idealized and regulative principle 
than a practical goal. Interestingly enough, Rescher both sees many points of contact 
(mutatis mutandis, of course) between the aforementioned stance and John Rawls’ 
well known social-contract theory, and many points of difference between Habermas 
and Rawls on the one side and himself on the other:
A theory geared to utopian assumptions can provide little guidance for real-life 
conditions. What is needed is, clearly, a process attuned to the suboptimal arrangements 
of an imperfect reality. A perfectly sensible approach to the rational legitimation of 
the political process can substitute for the contractual-idealization approach of social-
contract theory (Rawls), or ideal-consensus theory of ‘discourse ethics’ (Habermas 
and Apel), the older and better-known mechanism of rational decision. And against 
the ‘utopian unrealism’ of the contractarian and consensus theorists, the present 
approach takes the more ‘realistic’ line of hard-nosed cost-benefit economics.13
Another key word - “acquiescence” - needs at this point be introduced. Given that the 
insistence on the pre-requisite of communal consensus is simply unrealistic, we must 
come to terms with concrete situations, i.e. with facts as real life presents us with. If, 
according to contractarian lines of thought, we take justice to be the establishment of 
arrangements that are (or, even better, would be) reached in idealized conditions, then 
we cannot help but noting that justice is not a feature of our imperfect world. “Life is 
unjust” is bound to be our natural conclusion, together with the acknowledgement 
that real-life politics is the art of the possible. It is obvious as well, however, that even 
in real-life politics we constantly need to make decisions and to take some course 
of action. How should we behave, then, given the fact that the so-called communal 
consensus turned out to be unachievable?
12 Obviously the non-traditional Marxism of the Frankfurt School is different from other, more familiar brands of the same 
doctrine which have been so popular in Europe for many decades. But, no doubt, the typical Marxist utopian quest for perfection 
and homogeneity is still there.
13 Ibid., pp. 178-179.
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The answer is that a modern and democratic society looks for social accommodation, 
which means that it always tries to devise methods for letting its members live 
together in peace even in those - inevitable - cases when a subgroup prevails over 
another. As Rescher as it, “the choice is not just between the agreement of the whole 
group or the lordship of some particular subgroup. Accommodation through general 
acquiescence is a perfectly practicable mode for making decisions in the public order 
and resolving its conflicts. And, given the realities of the situation in a complex and 
diversified society, it has significant theoretical and practical advantages over its more 
radical alternatives.”14 The reader will not find it difficult to recognize that this is just 
the strategy constantly adopted within the democratic societies of the Western world, 
which, in turn, distinguishes them from all forms of tirannies and monocratic forms of 
government still thriving nowadays on our planet.
Acquiescence is not geared to the necessity of finding agreement with others: its 
characteristic feature is, rather, the willingness to get on without agreement. Daily life 
teaches us that, when conditions of reciprocal respect are maintained and enforced by 
law, we are able to go along with other people even though we do not share their views 
(and, obviously, viceversa). We have, in sum, an acquiescence of diversity that makes 
toleration of others’ opinions possible. Unlike John Stuart Mill, Rescher does not take 
the merit of such tolerance to be a requisite for progress towards the realization of 
ultimate Truth, but, rather, as a pre-condition for pursuing in peace our own projects. 
It should be clear, thus, how distant he is from the positions of Francis Fukuyama, who 
claims that the end of Marxism means the end of history as well, accompanied by the 
foreseeable final triumph of Western democracy over any other form of political/social 
organization.15 However appealing this kind of democratic messianism may be to the 
media and the large public, it resembles too closely the Marxist brand of messianism 
which it took such a long time to defeat.
Acquiescence is thus a matter of mutual restraint, a sort of “live and let live” concrete 
politics that permits to any individual or subgroup belonging in a larger group to 
avoid fight in order to gain respect for its own position. Rescher cites in this regard an 
historical episode that is more helpful than any theoretical definition for understanding 
the difference between acquiescence and consensus:
Shortly after the end of the Civil War, in early 1866, Robert E. Lee, generalissimo of 
the just-defeated Confederacy, was asked to testify before a hostile Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction of the US Congress. Interrogated about the stance of the former 
secessionists towards Washington’s plans and programmes for them, Lee was 
pressed on whether the Southeners agreed with these and whether ‘they are friendly 
towards the government of the United States’? Choosing his words carefully, Lee 
14 Ibid., p. 166.
15 See F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 1992.
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replied, ‘I believe they entirely acquiesce in the government’. The difference between 
acquiescence and agreement cannot be shown much more clearly.16
Thus acquiescence, and not consensual agreement, turns out to be the key factor for 
building a really democratic society. In a situation like that of the former Yugoslavia, 
for instance, it would be foolish to ask for consensus given the historical and ethnical 
roots of the war that was fought. But a search for acquiescence would be much less 
foolish, with all factions giving up something in order to avoid even greater damages 
and losses.
If we want to be pluralists in the true spirit of Western democratic thought, we must 
abandon the quest for a monolithic and rational order, together with the purpose of 
maximizing the number of people who approve what the government, say, does. On 
the contrary, we should have in mind an acquiescence-seeking society where the goal 
is that of minimizing the number of people who strongly disapprove of what is being 
done. We should never forget, in fact, that the idea that “all should think alike” is both 
dangerous and anti-democratic, as history shows with plenty of pertinent examples. 
Since consensus is an absolute unlikely to be achieved in concrete life, a difference 
must be drawn between “being desirable” and “being essential.” All in all, it can be 
said that it qualifies at most for the former status. The general conclusion is that 
“consensus is no more than one positive factor that has to be weighed on the scale 
along with many others.”17
It is worth stressing the similarity between Rescher’s epistemology and political/social 
philosophy: they both rest on his skepticism about idealization. In neither case we 
can get perfect solutions to our problems, short of supposing an actually unattainable 
idealization. We have to be fallibilists in epistemology because we are emplaced in 
suboptimal conditions, where our knowledge is not (and cannot be either) perfected. 
In other words, we have to be realistic and settle for imperfect estimates (that is, 
the best we can obtain). In politics, however, the situation is similar. Since we cannot 
(for the aforementioned reasons) realize a Habermas-style idealized consensus, we 
must settle for what people will go along with, i.e. “acquiesce in”. This may not be 
exactly what most of us would ideally like but, in any case, if we insist on “perfection 
or nothing,” we shall get a situation very far away from our ideal standards. In the 
socio-political context, “realism” means settling for “the least of the evils” because, 
as history teaches, disaster will follow if we take the line that only perfection is good 
enough.
16 N. Rescher, Pluralism, cit., pp. 164-165.
17 Ibid., p. 199.
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